"may be applied to a people among whom there exists a significant movement toward political, economic, or cultural autonomy. . . "4 Nationalism has found increasing attention as a dynamic of the Latin American process. Professor Kalman Silvert views nationalism in Latin America as a sort of reaction to modernity which manifests itself in a reluctance "to renounce the advantages of traditionalism and an oversimplified universalism... ."5 Fontaine and Kohnstamm find it more meaningful to focus on the metaphysical side of the concept of nationalism, the operational value of which dichotomizes into two hypotheses: either "the nation is an end in itself, or the nation is tending to be left behind by current events."6 Professor Scott prefers to speak of a "constructive nationalism" which he relates to a country's ability to cope effectively with problems both at home and abroad which impede national integration; Professor Whitaker feels that the meaning of the concept is best drawn out "in terms of its functioning as an instrument of integration and the realization of desired goals."7 According to Professor Fitzgibbon, "nationalism in Latin America . . . gears into the traditional pattern of oligarchic monopoly built upon a sharp horizontal social dichotomy."8 To date, it is not possible to speak of a general definition of nationalism nor to discover common agreement on the meaning of the terms employed to describe it. Nationalism is in effect many things. It has various ramifications, and this observation points up one of the major difficulties that will be encountered by the student who ventures to explore this concept within the framework of the problems surrounding political behavior in the Argentine context. Nationalism can exist at any point in time and is sensitive to the stresses and strains of its particular environment. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to allow that nationalism is described in terms of the political culture of a country (whether in a developed or underdeveloped stage of growth) which manifests itself either directly or indirectly in the attitudes or goal-orientations of similar or dissimilar interest groups toward either real or theoretical issues relating to the problem of building and/or preserving the nation-state.9 In this connection there are certain identifiable patterns of Argentine nationalism which should be considered at least from a theoretical standpoint.
PATTERNS OF NATIONALISM
There are several complementary situations which seem to point up the presence of nationalism and which appropriately enough may provide some semblance of order to the analysis of the character which nationalism has assumed in the Argentine context. The thesis advanced in the following paragraphs is simply that there is not one, but several, fluid patterns of nationalism in the Argentine political system.
There is what may be called a nationalism of manifest destiny which characterizes the very psychological make-up of the Argentine people. This particular frame of mind emerged in part from their colonial heritage and, later on, the achievement of independence which filled them with millennial expectations for the realization of an El Dorado in which their national superiority would hold sway.10 Ortega y Gasset describes this facet of Argentine behavior:
The Argentine people are not content to be one nation among many; they require an exalted destiny, they demand of themselves a proud future, they have no taste for a history without triumph and are determined to command. They may or may not succeed, but it is extremely interesting to witness the historical trajectory of a people called to empire.ll Also to be noted around this time is the emergence of another form of nationalism which may be labeled creole nationalism. This particular form of nationalism is best described in terms of its political and ideological framework within which a number of political alterations and 9 This definition is, on balance, conjectural and, of necessity, approximate; it is intended to be more heuristic than comprehensive in scope. For those who want labels, it may perhaps be explained as a kind of "reactive nationalism," reacting negatively against forces which threaten the nation's independence, cohesiveness, political organization, autonomy, legitimacy; and reacting positively toward all policy-moves intended to enhance national status. This rigid ideological orientation of porteio nationalism triggered in turn another form of nationalist sentiment which manifested itself somewhat in the guise of a patriotism among the rural sectors of the Littoral and of the interior.19 Briefly, this was a regional nationalism, opposed to the centralism of the Port and strongly in favor of a federalism which would underscore the special virtues of provincial autonomy.20
The prospects for reconciling the nationalism of the Port with that of the peripheral regions proved unworkable. Instead, a polarization of interests took place crystallizing in the formation of two political groups: the Unitarists (unitarios) and the Federals (federales), the former supporting control by Buenos Aires, the latter opposing it.21 Underlying the forces of political cleavage, there remained a strong desire for compromise and consensus on the all-important issue of preserving the country's hard-won nationhood. The problem, simply stated, was one of trying to reconcile the aspirations and interests of the interior with those of Buenos Aires. Several measures were attempted, the gist of which was to work out a kind of peaceful co-existence between two systems of government.22 The Buenos Aires elite opted in favor of centralism while the caudillos of the interior held fast to the principle of provincial autonomy.23 The Argentine people were thus subjected to the stimuli of two nationalisms, two conceptions of the state and two approaches to the problem of organizing the nation as a stable unit. In effect, the problem was not so much one of defining the national interests but rather of determining the ultimate center of authority through which the national interest could be funneled and articulated as an institutionalized norm.
There were obstacles to national unification but an awareness of nationhood continued to influence the general goals of political action. It finally took the authoritarian devices of the powerful gaucho chief, Juan Manuel de Rosas, to break the political stalemate and to achieve unification of the country. To the extent that we are trying to approximate patterns or tendencies of nationalism in the Argentine experience, it may be useful to ask to what extent there exists an essential link between nationalism and the federalizing process. Even to hint at this question is to open up a Pandora's box of debatable issues which may best be passed over in silence. The long-abiding issues which federalism involves cannot be settled in the present study. Nevertheless, the influence of federalism as it relates to the problem of nationalism in Argentina should be noted here.
It is a great deal easier to assert the compatibility and/or incompatibility of both these processes than to lay out with any measure of precision theoretical arguments for or against the priority given one over the other. It has been vigorously affirmed by Professor Friedrich that Federalism and nationalism are neither naturally linked, as the nineteenth century was inclined to believe, nor are they naturally opposed to each other as is at times asserted at present. It depends upon the underlying social structure of the political communities which are to be federally organized.28
In the Argentine experience, it would appear that nationalism and federalism tend to complement each other, underscoring more the forces of integration than those of differentiation. In sum, the process is one in which, as Pellegrini puts it, "Las Provincias mandan, la capital dirige", literally translated, "the provinces demand, the capital directs. Per6n's approach was direct and forceful, and the goal of his nationalism was the enhancement of Argentine prestige both at home and abroad.38 But, as Professor Lagos notes, Per6n's policy of prestige did not conform to "the real status of the nation," i.e., the capacity of the nation to survive the military and economic undercurrents of world politics.39 No one will deny that the prerequisites for the success of Peronist nationalism were present (and some still are even today) at the time Per6n decided upon developing a philosophical defense of his regime. The Argentines were in the right frame of mind to pay heed to, if not to welcome, any ideology that would cater to their aspirations for national grandeur.
To approximate why Peronist nationalism in its broadest outlines failed, it might be useful to examine briefly Per6n's political system. A diagram of Juan Domingo Peron's regime in terms of the Easton model40 would show both demands and supports originating in labor, the military, the Church, and in the masses. Support for his government stemmed in the main from the argentinidad or national feeling of the Argentine people, the ability of the government to produce satisfactory outputs for the varying demands of the military, the magnanimous rewards given labor, not to mention the material and legal advantages given to the Church.41 He managed to keep all these factors of support in a fluid coalition. His government was a personal one and, true to Almond's model of the authoritarian political system, the political functions of articulation, aggregation, and rule-making could hardly be differentiated from one another.42 The boundaries between party, legislature, and bureaucracy were poorly maintained; but, through the Peronist party and a cogent form of personalismo, Peron managed to link up to himself the government, the regime, and the entire nation.
With his official doctrine of justicialismo, a name which stressed "social justice, along with the need for more reform, idealism, order and discipline, hierarchy, patriotism, and a sense of the heroic,"43 Peron was able to initiate a program of politicization aimed at creating legitimacy for his regime and transmitting it into the system. But, justicialismo was vague and did not win Per6n the necessary support to maintain the regime when it became impossible for the system to produce satisfactory outputs for the members of the political system. The military thus became discontented because the system was collapsing and their demands could not be met.
The failure of the system to generate satisfactory outputs may generally be attributed to the fact that Argentina ran out of foreign exchange. Per6n got to the point where he could not satisfy anyone, not even his close friend, labor. He was forced to compromise one of the most important gifts of his revolution: dignity and self-respect.44 Ideology alone was not sufficient to see him through his economic difficulties and Per6n was forced to curry the favor of the United States for a loan from the Export-Import Bank and, in an even more humiliating gesture, to ratify the Rio de Janeiro Treaty on Reciprocal Aid. He followed this by passing an "investment law" in 1953 which welcomed foreign capital to Argentina in apparent renunciation of his former na- The lesson to be learned from Peron's experience is that it is very easy to clothe ideas associated with democratization, industrialization, rationalization and nation-building in the respectable garments of ideology and label it nationalism. A more appropriate label for such nationalism would perhaps be opportunism, the politically motivated ideology which is not oriented toward the building or enhancing of a nation's status but rather to a philosophical rationale committed to derive the maximum political income from traditional value-orientations for the benefit of a closed elite. As Professor Fitzgibbon points out in his analysis of the Argentine revolution of '43:
The chief value of the justicialist dialectic was for internal consumption; it gave the movement (or so its leaders assumed) an appearance of genuineness.
It is difficult to avoid a charge of spuriousness against the Argentine revolution, especially now that it has been officially repudiated, but to stop with that is to oversimplify and sell short its character. Peron, its catalyst and spokesman, was unquestionably an opportunist. Argentina had, however, long been ripe for a revolt of the masses or at least a social reform which would alleviate the absurdly medieval conditions prevailing there. Peron simply captured the revolution. What has been stressed in the preceding paragraphs are but broad characteristics of certain aspects of the Argentine syndrome of nationism as it appears in the setting of the Argentine political culture. We are reminded that Argentine nationalism is widespread and ebullient but, like the political behavior of the Argentines themselves, difficult to typify, for, as Jose Luis Romero indicated some years ago, "the collective personality of the country is still in process of formation."59
